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Copyright ©In this paper, we experimentally investigate how goal setting and feedback policies affect
work performance. In particular, we study the effects of (i) absolute performance feedback,
(ii) self-specified goals, and (iii) exogenous goals and relative performance feedback. Our re-
sults show that the average performance of the subjects who are provided self-performance
feedback is 11% lower than the oneswho obtain no feedback.Moreover, setting a non-binding
personal goal does not affect performance. Finally, assigning an exogenous goal and
providing relative performance feedback decreases performance by 8%. We discuss the in-
sights our findings offer for the optimal design of goal setting and feedback mechanisms.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.1. INTRODUCTION
Incentives are at the core of our lives. Especially in
organizations, vast resources are spent to design
incentives in order to align the objectives of the
organization and the employees. To achieve this, in
addition to frequent use of monetary incentives (e.g.,
bonuses), there are other commonly used methods
such as specific goal setting, deadlines, social/peer
pressure, and feedback mechanisms. Given the
widespread use of these methods in practice, it is
crucial to understand how they interact with each other
and how people actually react to them. 1
This experimental study examines the interactive ef-
fects of different goal setting and feedback mechanisms
on work performance. Specifically, we investigate
whether and how self-performance feedback only and
self-specified goals combined with self-performance
feedback affect work performance.2 We further study
how incentivized assigned-goals interacting with
relative performance feedback influence performance.ce to: Department of Economics, İpek University,
Bulvarı, 648. Cadde, Oran, 06550, Ankara, Turkey.
@ipek.edu.tr
2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Feedback that provides information about em-
ployees’ performance is a commonly used information
sharing method in work environments that allows
people to make more informed decisions. Feedback
and its effectiveness have been studied mostly in
organizational behavior and psychology literature for
a long time. However, there is not much of a
consensus about how different feedback mechanisms
influence employee performance (Balcazar et al.,
1985; Kluger and DeNisi, 1996; Locke et al., 1990
and Van-Dijk and Kluger, 2004). There are several
features that may jointly determine the effectiveness
of feedback such as feedback cues, task properties,
and situational and methodological variables.
Different combinations of these factors may result in
different feedback effects. In this paper, using a lab
experiment, we first investigate whether and how
merely providing continuous self-performance feed-
back affects work performance in a context within
which there is piece-rate payment for performance
and no goals are set for participants.
The use of feedback only mechanisms leads to non-
uniform results on performance, which was actually
argued by Becker (1978) and Ilgen et al. (1979): a
Z. AKIN AND E. KARAGÖZOĞLU194goal without feedback is useless and feedback that
does not match an existing goal is of little use.3
However, this does not automatically imply that every
goal with feedback is beneficial. Erez (1977) empha-
sizes that if feedback is combined with motivational
effects of setting specific goals that are challenging
but attainable, then it leads to beneficial effects on
performance. Falk and Knell (2007) theoretically in-
vestigate how people choose goals optimally and
show that goals should be high enough to feel the chal-
lenge and low enough to prevent feelings of failure.
Thus, it can be conjectured that the specific choice of
goals will determine whether specified goals supported
by feedback produce a positive effect on performance.
In this paper, we secondly address the relationship
between non-binding (not backed up by any monetary
incentives) self-specified goals4 combined with
self-performance feedback and work performance.
This comparison allows us to understand the effect
of self-chosen, non-binding goals as an internal
regulatory/motivational tool on work performance.5
Finally, in order to further explore the interaction
between goals and feedback in determining perfor-
mance, we study how and to what extent an exoge-
nously given goal made salient by monetary incentives
interacts with relative performance feedback. Locke
and Latham (1990) suggest that feedback content
and perception of (especially exogenously assigned)
goal’s attainability are closely related. Negative feed-
back improves performance as long as the goal is
perceived as attainable, and positive feedback may
not affect (even deteriorate) performance especially
when there is no further incentive such as piece rate.
Relative performance feedback or performance
appraisals involve sharing information about where
an agent stands in his or her work group. Especially
in managerial economics and organizational behavior
literature, this topic has been studied extensively (for
review articles, see Levy & Williams, 2004; Buunk
& Gibbons, 2007). One vein of research is pessimistic
about its effects: the management literature (e.g.,
Milkovich & Newman, 1996) in general concludes
that advantages of revealing true performance
information to the employee are outweighed by its dis-
advantages.6 Eriksson, Poulsen, and Villeval (2009),
in a lab experiment, find that regardless of the pay
scheme used, feedback does not improve performance
and information feedback reduces the quality of the
low performers’ work.7 On the other hand, there is a
stream of both laboratory and field researches that is
more optimistic. In a laboratory experiment, Azmat
and Iriberri (2012) find a significant and positive effectCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.of relative performance feedback on performance,
independent of the subjects’ standings. Hannan et al.
(2008) find a positive effect regardless of the content
of the feedback under piece-rate incentives.8 Conflict-
ing implications of the studies in the literature are
potentially due to the existence of various design
parameters and factors in the decision environment
(Kluger and DeNisi, 1996). There are obviously other
psychological factors, such as evaluation effect,
motivation effect, self-image effect, and sorting effect
(Ederer, 2010). In this paper, we finally examine
whether the interaction between assigned goals and
relative performance feedback has an effect on perfor-
mance. Participants are assigned an exogenous goal
that is incentivized by a two-level piece-rate payment
scheme – to make the target more salient – and also
provided continuous average group performance.
With this information, one can infer not only whether
he or she is performing better/worse than the group
average but also how far he or she is from the average
throughout the experiment. We believe that poten-
tially, group feedback signals whether the target is
attainable and works as a moderator variable, influenc-
ing the relationship between actual performance and
the exogenous target, especially for the ones who lag
behind the target.
Our design involves data entry as a real-effort
task. It is an attention-focused task, which is ability
independent and not enjoyable. It is also repetitive,
which mimics real-life jobs that involve repeating the
same tasks over time. As mentioned, participants are
rewarded according to piece-rate incentives. After
completion of each task, feedback information is
updated, which differs across treatments.
Our analyses yield some interesting results that are,
we believe, driven by different psychological factors.
First of all, we find that providing self-performance
feedback has a negative effect on performance. This
is possibly due to the specific task feature, which
requires subjects to stay focused throughout the task
completion stage. The piece-rate incentive structure
further enforces the need to stay focused. We believe
that combining an intense task with frequent self-
performance feedback distracted subjects and caused
them to focus less on the task compared with the ones
who obtained no feedback at all. This allows us to
make some inferences about the relationship between
feedback frequency and task intensity. Second, in con-
trast with earlier studies9 reporting that self-specified
goals have positive effects on performance, our results
show that self-specified goals do not affect the perfor-
mance. We believe this result is mainly driven by theManage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
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prediction of how many tasks that can be completed
and by not being challenging at all.
Finally, given an exogenously assigned goal, which
is supported by a two-level piece-rate payment
scheme, we observe that providing relative perfor-
mance information deteriorates the overall perfor-
mance compared with the case in which this
information is not provided. While this intervention
has no effect on the good performers, the overall
decline is mainly driven by the worse performances
of the ones who could not attain the goal. The
combination of relative performance feedback with
an exogenously determined goal and its emphasized
salience by the two-level piece-rate incentive scheme
is the potential reason of this negative effect on the
ones who are unable to attain the target.10 Our result
in this case can be connected to the relationship
between negative feedback and goal’s attainability
made salient by our payment scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the experimental design in detail.
Section 3 describes our experimental results. Section 4
concludes with a brief discussion of the implications
and limitations of our results.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was conducted in May 2012 in the
experimental lab of TOBB University of Economics
and Technology (Ankara, Turkey) with undergradu-
ates from various majors. All sessions were
conducted in a computerized environment and lasted
approximately 1 h. In total, we had 10 groups and
five treatments. We gathered data from 157 subjects.
Announcement was made by email, and students
signed up a group online. Subjects were identified
by their ID number. Once they are registered online,
the system automatically recognizes their ID number
and email addresses. In addition to a 5 TL show-up
fee, the average participant earned 18 TL (total of 23
TL ~$13). After the arrival at the lab, subjects wereTable 1. Experimental Design






Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.placed randomly to separate computer stations that
prevent seeing others’ screens. The experiment
started with the instructions, which were read aloud
to all subjects (See Appendix for the instructions
of TR5). The following stages were a 5-min trial
period, the 30-min actual task, and survey, in that
order. After the survey, subjects were paid privately,
and the experiment ended (Screen shot for TR3 is
shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix).
Participants completed a data entry task that is one
of the commonly used real-effort tasks in the literature
(e.g., Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2010; Gneezy and List,
2006). The task was entering (hypothetical) exam
grades of students on the computer screen. There
was a set of 20 hypothetical student ID numbers and
corresponding grades.11 On the right of it, the ID
numbers were randomly ordered, and the subjects
were supposed to find and enter the corresponding
grade correctly. If all 20 grades were entered correctly,
this was counted as a successfully completed task.
After pressing OK, the screen was refreshed; a new
set of numbers were displayed, and the information
on the right of the screen was updated.
In total, we conducted five treatments. Details
about each treatment are summarized in Table 1.
Subjects in all treatments always saw the remaining
time on their screens. In all treatments except TR1,
they were also provided their own performance in
terms of their correct answers/entries and the amount
earned until that time. Only in TR5 that participants
were able to see the average of their group’s number
of successfully completed tasks in a continuously
updated fashion. In all treatments, participants
earned money in a linear piece-rate fashion. They
earned 1 TL (approximately 55 cents at the time of
the experiment) per successfully completed task.
Moreover, in TR4 and TR5, after reaching the
exogenously assigned target, they earned 50% more
per task (1.5 TL). This is sort of a two-level linear
piece-rate payoff scheme (because before the target,
they earn 1 TL per task, and after the target, they
earn 1.5 TL per task). Regarding the target, in TR1
and TR2, subjects did not choose or were notGroup feedback Payoff
No Linear piece rate
No Linear piece rate
No Linear piece rate
No Two-level linear piece rate
Yes Two-level linear piece rate
Manage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
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Z. AKIN AND E. KARAGÖZOĞLU196assigned a target number of tasks. On the other
hand, in TR3, subjects determined their own target
task number that they planned to finish in 30min
task period. Each subject always saw his or her
target on the screen during the actual experiment.
Subjects in TR3 were asked to specify a target after
the 5min trial period and before the 30min actual
task. In TR4 and TR5, subjects were assigned a
target task number (the assigned target is 13). In
TR3, the target did not affect the payoff of the
agents (they were paid as described whether they
reached their target or not).
TR1 can be considered as the base treatment
where there is no determined target or feedback at
all. By comparing TR1 and TR2, we can investigate
the effect of providing feedback about own perfor-
mance. Comparing TR2 and TR3 allows us to test
whether a self-chosen and non-binding target affects
the performance compared with a case where no
explicit target is set. Because TR4 and TR5 only
differ in group feedback dimension, by comparing
them, we can identify the effect of revealing the
group average (that is potentially interacting with
the assigned target) on performance. These are
summarized in Table 1. Table 2 summarizes the
main comparisons and the investigated effects.
In TR1, only the task number and the remaining
time information were shown. In TR2, all information
in the screen shot except the target was shown.
In TR4, instead of ‘Target You Set (Earnings)’,
the following was shown ‘Your Target (Earnings):
13 (TL)’. The exogenous target and corresponding
earnings were set as 13 and 13 TL, which is deter-
mined on the basis of our analysis of pilot sessions
run previously. In TR4 and TR5, because a two-levelable 2. Main Comparisons
reatment comparison Investigated effect
R1 vs. TR2 Effect of self-feedback
R2 vs. TR3 Effect of self-imposed target
R4 vs. TR5 Effect of group feedback
able 3. Summary Statistics for the Average Time per Completed Tasks by Treatments
reatment Obs Mean Median SD Min. Max. 25th perc. 75th perc.
29 115.03 114 16.7 84 144 106 122
30 131.9 130 29.44 95 252 111 142
33 133.27 128 26.39 93 188 110 149
28 121.71 120 19.12 97 192 107 130
36 131.75 129 25.52 78 191 117 146















Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.linear piece-rate scheme was used, once the subjects
reached the target, their earnings were calculated
differently afterwards. The screens in TR4 and TR5
were exactly the same except that the subjects in
TR5 also saw information about the average number
of successfully completed tasks in their group on the
bottom right of the screen. In the instructions, all of
these details including the type of feedback they
would obtain were clearly explained.
The main independent variables we use in our
analyses are self-performance feedback, goal setting,
and relative performance feedback. We measure and
use the completion time of each (both correct and
incorrect) task and the completion time of each correct
task as dependent variables. Moreover, we used some
demographic and personality trait variables as controls
in the analysis.3. RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. Table 3
shows summary statistics for the average time per
completed task (in seconds). As mentioned earlier,
we actually look at two different variables, which are
completion time per completed task and completion
time per successfully completed task. Throughout the
paper, in our reported results, dependent variable is
the first variable. We repeated all the regressions with
the latter. Unless otherwise noted, the results are
qualitatively the same. Table 4 summarizes the main
comparisons between the treatments in terms of both
the average time of completed tasks and average time
of successfully completed tasks. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of task completion times for each
treatment. Averages in each treatment and in the
pooled data are also shown in the figure.
In the following subsections, we make pairwise
treatment comparisons. In each case, some nonparametric
tests and simple regression analyses with aggregate
level treatment data are followed by panel data analysis.Manage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/mde









*p< 0.1;**p< 0.05;***p< 0.01.
THE ROLE OF GOALS AND FEEDBACK IN INCENTIVIZING PERFORMANCE 1973.1. The Effect of Self-performance Feedback
(TR1 vs. TR2)
Because TR1 is the control treatment in the sense that
neither feedback is given nor a target is assigned to the
subjects, comparing TR1 with TR2 gives us the effect
of giving self-performance feedback. The average task
completion times in TR1 and TR2 are 115 and 131.9 s,
respectively. Average completion time is less (approx-
imately by 11%) in TR1 than in TR2. This difference
is statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
p=0.014). Moreover, we also tested the equality of
distributions of average task completion time using aFigure 1. Distribution of Task Completion Times. [C
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test between TR1
and TR2: the null hypothesis of equality of distribu-
tions is rejected (p=0.054; for average successful task
completion time, it is marginally rejected, p=0.10).
We then run simple OLS regressions by taking TR1
as the base treatment. The results are presented in
Table 5. In model 1, we compare the effects of each
treatment on the completion time of tasks. The
coefficient of the dummy variable for TR2 is positive
and significant. This supports the result of our non-
parametric analyses that compared with TR1; task
completion time is significantly higher in TR2. Model
2 additionally takes into account the performance in
the trial period. It turns out that the performance in
the trial period is a good predictor of the actual
performance and other coefficients are almost
quantitatively the same as in model 1 and significant.
Model 3 also includes some control variables such as
gender, grade point average (GPA), and competitive-
ness. Our previous results are confirmed in model 3, as
well. Signs of most of the control variables are as
predicted, but none of them are statistically significant.12olor figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Manage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
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Table 5. OLS Estimation – Completion Time
Dependent variable Completion time
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
TR2 16.86*** (6.201) 15.92*** (5.659) 14.95** (5.907)
TR3 18.23*** (5.545) 19.39*** (5.100) 16.942*** (5.269)
TR4 4.076 (4.042) 3.367 (4.325) 1.917 (4.630)
TR5 16.71*** (5.271) 17.52*** (4.999) 17.65*** (5.214)




Constant 115.03*** 130.69** 140.37***
Number of obs 155 155 155
R2 0.095 0.273 0.314
P-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
aControl variables: gender (4.665, p = 0.27), grade point average (0.423, p = 0.85), competitive (1.25, p = 0.23), preventive
(1.383, p = 0.19), and promotion (1.264, p = 0.34).
*, **, and *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Z. AKIN AND E. KARAGÖZOĞLU198In order to fully utilize the detailed data we obtain,
we finally run a panel regression by using all the task
completion times of each subject. We run random
effects model in order not to lose variables that are
fixed (e.g., several individual characteristics) and to
capture the treatment effects.13 Random effects are at
the subject level. We pool (unbalanced) data from
TR1 and TR2 and estimate the following equation to
quantify the effect of giving self-performance feedback
(TR2 is a dummy variable whose value is 1 for
treatment 2) on the completion time of subject i task
j, (Completion Time)ij.
Completion Timeð Þij ¼ β0 þ β1TR2þ β1Trend
þX ’ijδþ εij:
(1)
The preceding equation is the most inclusive model
we run, that is, model 5. Models 4 and 5 include a
linear trend. Additional controls (X) include variablesTable 6. Panel Analysis of Treatments 1 and 2
Dependent variable
Model (1) (2)











Notes: aRobust standard errors are in parentheses.
bTo check whether there is a significant difference across subjects, we
zero (no panel effect). We repeat this for every regression. In every cas
run a random effect model rather than a simple OLS regression.
cControl variables: gender (14.979, p = 0.03), aid (1.996, p = 0.71
(0.25, p = 0.81), and promotion (0.89, p = 0.75).
*, **, and *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.such as ability, errors made, gender, and competitive-
ness. All the details can be found in Table 6.
In model 1, we include neither linear trend nor any
other controls. According to the random effect estima-
tor, having self-performance feedback (i.e., TR2
variable) has a highly significant effect on the comple-
tion time, and this effect stays significant in all
the models although its magnitude changes a little.
Overall, the marginal effect is about 17 s, which corre-
sponds to approximately 11% decline in performance.
Model 2 adds the number of successfully completed
tasks in the trial period (variable called ‘trial’) to
model 1 as a proxy for the ability of the subjects.14
While the coefficient of TR2 is almost the same, the
corresponding coefficient is negative and statistically
significant, which implies that trial period perfor-
mance is a good predictor of the actual performance.15
Model 3 controls for the errors that the subjects madeCompletion time
(3) (4) (5)
16.29*** (5.332) 15.92*** (5.157) 13.24*** (4.736)
10.88*** (3.359) 10.32*** (3.123) 12.26*** (2.945)
3.094 (9.887) 3.324 (10.17) 3.117 (9.948)
0.369 (0.287) 0.361 (0.274)
No No Yes




run LM test whose null hypothesis is that variances across entities is
e, we reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.000). Thus, it is appropriate to
), competitive (2.82, p = 0.10), bored (0.649, p = 0.58), preventive
01 level, respectively.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
THE ROLE OF GOALS AND FEEDBACK IN INCENTIVIZING PERFORMANCE 199in the actual task, but it is not significant. Model 4
further adds a linear trend (warming-up effect) to
capture the general evolution of task completion time
over the course of the experiment. However, this is
not statistically significant either. Finally, in model 5,
we add more control variables such as gender and
competitiveness.16 None of the coefficient estimates
of these control variables is significant, except gender
(male is approximately 15 s faster than females). To
sum up, the panel data analysis confirms the previous
results obtained from nonparametric analysis. These
findings are summarized in our first result:
Result 1: Under a piece-rate payment scheme, in
an intense task with time–pressure, providing
feedback about self-performance mitigates per-
formance compared to the case where no
feedback is provided.
We believe that potential reasons for this seemingly
negative result are the following. Firstly, providing
feedback or any other (even potentially useful) infor-
mation during an intense task may distract attention
and divert focus to progress rather than the task itself.
In the first treatment, subjects intensively focus on the
task because the only available information (other than
the task itself) on the screen is the time left. On the
other hand, subjects are provided information on their
progress in TR2. Because this information is continu-
ously present on the screen during the task, it might
have distracted subjects’ attention from the task.17
Secondly, there is potentially an uncertainty effect. In
TR2, subjects are informed about how many tasks
they (successfully) complete and how much they earn
at any point during the experiment. This might have
created a feeling of progress and a satisfaction associ-
ated with it, which may lead to a more relaxed task
behavior. On the other hand, when subjects do not
receive any other information other than time left, they
are under time pressure and they do not know how
well they were doing until that time, which may lead
them to put more effort to complete as many tasks as
they can. Another reason may be the wealth effect,
which is likely to be present in experiments where
participants can observe their accumulated earnings
throughout the experimental session. The presence of
a wealth effect would imply that if a participant has
a reference earning in his or her mind, his or her
performance may fall as he or she observes his or her
accumulated earnings approaching to this reference
earning. In TR2, our participants can continuously ob-
serve howmuch they earned and how it accumulates as
they proceed. Therefore, their performances mightCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.have been affected negatively by the presence of
updated progress/earning information.3.2. The Effect of a Self-chosen Target
(TR2 vs. TR3)
Average task completion times in TR2 (no assigned or
self-chosen target) and in TR3 (subjects choose their
own targets) are 131.9 and 133.27 s, respectively. This
difference is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p=0.77). The null hypothesis of the
equality of distributions between TR2 and TR3 cannot
be rejected either (p=0.629).
To further test this no difference result, after
running OLS regressions (Table 5), for each model,
we test whether the coefficients of the dummy vari-
ables for TR2 and TR3 are identical. We cannot reject
the null hypotheses that these two coefficients are
identical, which confirms our previous nonparametric
test results (in models 1, 2, and 3, p-values are
0.846, 0.563, and 0.742, respectively).
We then pool the (unbalanced) data from TR2 and
TR3 and estimate Equation (1) to quantify the effect of
the self-chosen target (TR3 is the dummy variable
whose value is 1 for treatment 3) on the completion
time of task j of subject i, (Completion Time)ij. All
the details can be found in Table 7. The coefficient
of TR3 is insignificant in all the models.
In model 1, the presence of a self-chosen target has
a positive but insignificant effect on the completion
time. Model 2 adds the number of successfully com-
pleted tasks in trial period to model 1, ‘trial’ variable,
as a proxy for the ability of the subjects. While the
coefficient of TR3 changes its sign, it is still not signif-
icant, whereas the corresponding coefficient estimate
of trial is negative and statistically significant. Model
3 controls for subjects’ errors, which turn out to be
negative, insignificant, and do not change the previous
coefficients. Model 4 with the linear trend captures the
learning (or warming up) effect. It shows that the
coefficient estimate is statistically significant but that
this warming up effect is weak. Finally, in model 5
with the inclusion of other control variables, signs
and significances of the main coefficients do not
change. The coefficients of the control variables are
not significant again except for gender with approxi-
mately the same effect. To sum up, the panel data
analysis supports the previously found results from
nonparametric analysis.
In order to understand why there is no significant
difference between making subjects setting an endog-
enous non-binding target and not setting it, we take aManage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
Table 7. Panel Analysis of Treatments 2 and 3
Dependent variable
Completion time
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TR3 3.09 (5.850) 3.48 (6.69) 3.46 (6.718) 2.98 (6.369) 1.36 (4.736)
Trial 17.73*** (4.683) 17.69*** (3.359) 16.76*** (4.303) 14.75*** (4.130)
Error 1.60 (7.300) 1.32 (7.539) 1.26 (7.495)
Trend 0.493** (0.252) 0.413* (0.243)
Controls
a
No No No No Yes
Constant 129.02*** (5.472) 156.21*** (10.324) 157.60*** (14.19) 158.57*** (13.674) 176.64*** (25.371)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847
Clusters 61 61 61 61 61
Prob>F 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
aControl variables: gender (13.56, p = 0.017), aid (8.757, p = 0.14), competitive (0.88, p = 0.53), bored (2.13, p = 0.14), preventive
(2.32, p = 0.11), and promotion (2.43, p = 0.38).
*, **, and *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Z. AKIN AND E. KARAGÖZOĞLU200closer look at the targets subjects set and their actual
performances. Firstly, data clearly reveals that
subjects used their performance in the trial period
when setting their targets. The higher the successfully
completed tasks in the trial period, the higher the set
target (Spearman rank correlation test: r=0.388 and
p=0.025). Secondly, when we compare the number
of tasks completed successfully and targets set, we
see that they are very close. The mean of the target18
is even less than the mean of the number of success-
fully completed tasks (11.78 and 12.43, respectively),
but they are not significantly different (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p=0.7342). Medians do not differ sig-
nificantly either (p=0.608). Moreover, the hypothesis
that the distributions of these two are equal cannot be
rejected (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p=0.762).
Figure 2 plots a kernel density estimate for both of
these variables, which indicate that the actually
completed tasks and the initially set targets are veryFigure 2. Kernel Distribution for “Target” and “Number of
Successfully Completed Tasks”. [Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.closely related. These findings are summarized in
Result 2:
Result 2: Under a piece-rate payment, self-
performance feedback scheme, and not incentiv-
ized, self-chosen targets, the presence of targets
does not make any difference in terms of
performance with respect to the case where no
explicit target is stated.
What we can infer from this result is that subjects
seem to have used setting a target as a mere (realistic
and somewhat conservative) guess/expectation of
how many tasks they can complete. In this sense,
targets did not play the role of an actual ‘goal’, even
though subjects see the targets in the screen through-
out the actual experiment. Thus, two potential reasons
for the no difference result are that targets were mere
expectations and were not challenging (for most
of the subjects) and the fact that targets were not
incentivized at all.3.3. The Effect of Providing Relative Performance
Feedback (TR4 vs. TR5)
Treatments 4 and 5 are different from the previous
three treatments in terms of both target and payoff
structure. Thus, we can only compare them with each
other. In these treatments, we assign, at the beginning
of the actual task, a target number of successfully
completed tasks for each subject (13, same for every-
one). Moreover, subjects are paid at a two-level
piece-rate fashion depending on whether they reach
this exogenously assigned target or not. Until they
reach the target, they earn 1 TL for each successfully
completed task, and once they reach the target, they
start earning 1.5 TL.Manage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
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subject) in TR4 (121.71) is approximately 8% less
than in TR5 (131.75). This difference is statistically
significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.043). The
null hypothesis of equality of distributions is rejected
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p=0.062). These show
that revealing information about how others are
doing leads to a deterioration of the overall perfor-
mance. In the OLS regressions (Table 5), we tested
whether the coefficients of the dummy variables for
TR4 and TR5 are the same for each model. In all
models, we reject the null hypothesis of equality of
coefficients (In models 1, 2, and 3, p-values are 0.012,
0.004, and 0.0004, respectively). Figure 3 shows the
differences in the mean completion times in TR4
and TR5.
In order to explore the data in more detail and see
whether the effects mentioned earlier are robust after
controlling different variables, we again run a randomFigure 3. Mean Completion Times in TR4 and TR5
(by Using Panel Data). [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Table 8. Panel Analysis of Treatments 4 and 5
Dependent variable
Model (1) (2)






Constant 122.12*** (3.510) 134.95*** (5.271)
Observations 904 904
Clusters 64 64
Prob> F 0.076 0.003
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
aControl variables: gender (2.32, p = 0.65), aid (6.94, p = 0.14),
(1.56, p = 0.42), and promotion (1.44, p = 0.31).
*, **, and *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.effects panel regression by pooling data from treat-
ments 4 and 5. We first estimate, again, Equation (1)
to see the effect of relative performance feedback.
All the details can be found in Table 8.
In model 1, TR5 has a positive but marginally
significant effect on the completion time (p=0.076),
and this effect remains positive and significant in all
models. Overall, the marginal effect is about 10 s,
which corresponds to approximately 8% lower perfor-
mance in TR5. Model 2 adds trial variable. While the
coefficient estimate of TR5 is higher (11 s), the coeffi-
cient estimate of trial is negative and statistically
significant. This intuitively shows that as the number
of correct answers increases in the trial period, the
average completion time decreases. Model 3 controls
for the errors subjects made. Its coefficient estimate
is positive but not significant, and its inclusion does
not change the previous coefficient estimates at all.
In model 4 with a linear trend, warming-up effect
is strong as the coefficient estimate of the trend is
negative and highly significant. Adding more control
variables affects neither the significance nor the
magnitude of the other coefficient estimates. None of
the coefficients of these control variables are signifi-
cant except competitiveness with the expected sign
(i.e., negative). To sum up, the results from panel data
analyses are parallel with the results from nonparamet-
ric analyses. These findings lead to our third result:
Result 3: Under a two-level piece-rate payment
and self-performance feedback scheme, provid-
ing relative performance information (group
average) worsens the overall performance.
A potential reason for this result comes from the
theory suggested by Locke and Latham (1990): as
long as the given negative feedback does not triggerCompletion time
(3) (4) (5)
11.12** (5.302) 10.35** (4.874) 10.63** (4.44)
10.92*** (3.359) 9.832*** (3.010) 7.56*** (2.579)
2.965 (4.621) 3.901 (4.754) 4.485 (4.773)
1.23*** (0.275) 1.09*** (0.270)
No No Yes




competitive (3.39, p = 0.012), bored (0.7, p = 0.60), preventive
01 level, respectively.
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improves performance. On the other hand, positive
feedback is expected at least not to enhance perfor-
mance especially if it is not further incentivized, such
as piece rate.
In order to further investigate the effect of group
average feedback, from which subjects can infer
their relative standings in their group, we separate
subjects in each treatment into two groups: the ones
who have numbers of successfully completed tasks
above and below the average.19 If we compare the
performance of the people who are above average
in TR4 and TR5, we see that the average completion
time of subjects in TR4 is less than in TR5 (111.8
vs. 114.2 s). However, the difference is not statisti-
cally significant (two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p=0.49). On the other hand, the average perfor-
mance of the people who are below average in TR5
is significantly less than the average performance of
the ones who are below average in TR4 (125.9 vs.
145.7 s, p=0.0063).20
In addition, when we look at the distributions of task
completion times in TR4 and TR5, we observe that the
dispersion in TR5 is higher than in TR4. We test this
by comparing standard deviations of completion times
across these treatments and find a significant difference
between them (overall p=0.0006 if we ignore one
outlier in TR4; for the ones below average p=0.013
and for the ones above average p=0.059).
This implies that revealing relative information
makes the performance more scattered and less steadyTable 9. Effect of Feedback Type and Reaching Tar
Dependent variable
Model (1) (2)
TR5 7.80* (4.197) 8.21* (
Belowave 14.97*** (4.759) 11.70*** (
Belowave*TR5 6.24 (6.389) 6.80 (
Attained
Attained*TR5
Trial 7.75*** (2.506) 6.61*** (
Error 8.93* (4.89) 8.48* (
Trend 1.30*** (0.267) 1.20*** (
Controls No Yes
Constant 126.41*** (7.165) 143.99*** (
Observations 904 904
Clusters 64 64
Prob > F 0.000 0.00
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
aControl variables: gender (3.24, p = 0.48), aid (4.49, p = 0.27), c
(1.3, p = 0.45), and promotion (0.22, p = 0.86).
bControl variables: gender (3.16, p = 0.53), aid (0.41, p = 0.90),
(0.509, p = 0.74), and promotion (0.85, p = 0.52).
*, **, and *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.across agents, especially for the ones who are below
average. The equality of distributions is also rejected
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p=0.062).
In order to capture the differences between partici-
pants with performances above and below average
more clearly, we run the following panel regression.
All the details can be found in Table 9.
Completion Timeð Þij ¼ β0 þ β1TR5þ β2Belowave
þ β3Belowave*TR5
þ β4Trend þ X ’ijδþ εij: (2)
Belowave is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if
the number of successfully completed tasks of an
agent (updated continuously when agent completes a
task successfully or not) is lower than the average
number of successfully completed tasks of the group
in the pooled data. Belowave*TR5 is the interaction
variable, which is equal to Belowave variable for only
TR5. In model 1, in addition to trend, we control for
ability and error. The coefficient estimate of the
treatment dummy (β1) is positive and significant
(p=0.063). This implies that subjects perform better
in TR4, which confirms previous results. The
coefficient estimate of Belowave (β2) is positive and
highly significant, which is intuitive. The interaction
variable’s coefficient estimate tells us whether there
is a difference between the below average subjects’
performances across treatments. Although this coeffi-
cient (β3) is positive as we found in the previousget (TR4 and TR5)
Completion time
(3) (4)
4.323) 12.89** (6.362) 17.57*** (5.730)
4.170)
5.922)
17.56*** (5.820) 12.83** (6.181)
12.63 (7.933) 16.02** (7.273)
2.312) 6.45*** (2.090) 5.82*** (1.942)
4.934) 6.279 (4.816) 6.241 (4.786)








ompetitive (2.73, p = 0.016), bored (0.65, p = 0.60), preventive
competitive (2.66, p = 0.01), bored (1.12, p = 0.32), preventive
01 level, respectively.
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Figure 4. Mean Completion Time by Treatment (4 and 5)
and Target Attainment. [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
THE ROLE OF GOALS AND FEEDBACK IN INCENTIVIZING PERFORMANCE 203analysis, it is not significant (p=0.328). Thus, we do
not find an evidence that supports the previous
findings from nonparametric and OLS regression
analysis (i.e., the difference between performance of
subjects in treatments is driven by the ones who are
below average). This result does not change qualita-
tively when we add the other controls in model 2.
In the goal-setting literature, the goals mainly
play a motivational role; and they are generally con-
sidered as reference (or anchor) points. Moreover,
targets that are considered as unattainable decrease
motivation/performance and vice versa (but this
effect is potentially mitigated by a piece-rate reward
scheme). Because we set an exogenous target for the
subjects in TR4 and TR5, we expect the target and
relative performance feedback to interact in the
following way: while relative performance feedback
may motivate the frontrunners about attainability of
the target and potentially boost their performance,
relative performance feedback may make non-
attainability of the target more salient for underdogs,
which may deteriorate their performance. To explore
this interaction, in model 3 in Table 9, we estimate
the following equation in which we investigate
whether reaching the exogenous target affects the
performance across the treatments.
Completion Timeð Þij ¼ β0 þ β1TR5þ β2Attained
þ β3Attained*TR5
þ β4Trend þ X ’ijδþ εij: (3)
Before the interpretation of regression results, it is
worth noting that 80% of subjects either reached the
target and were always above average or could not
reach the target and were always below average.
That is, only 20% were in the margin of reaching
the target (they completed 10, 11, 12, or 13.). Thus,
by looking at the effect of reaching the target or not
on the performance, we can argue whether informa-
tion about relative performance feedback plays a
mediator role.
Variable Attained is a dummy variable taking value
1 if the agent completed 13 or more tasks successfully
at the end of the experiment. Within a treatment, a big
performance difference between the ones who attained
and did not attain the target implies a wide distribution
of performances and vice versa. In TR5, there is a
large and significant difference (the sum of β2 and
β3) and when other controls are added, it becomes
larger. In TR4, this difference is much smaller when
other controls are added (β2 in model 4, Table 9). ThisCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.supports the previous findings about the distributions
of the performances across treatments.
Between TR4 and TR5, there is no performance
difference between subjects who attained the target
(the sum of β1 and β3 is positive, but the null hypoth-
esis that this sum is zero cannot be rejected, p=0.74).
However, there is a significant difference between
subjects who could not attain the target across
treatments (β1 = 17.57 with p=0.002). In TR5, these
subjects perform much worse. Thus, we can say that
the overall performance difference between two
treatments comes from the performance difference of
subjects who are not able to attain the target and the po-
tential reason for this is the treatment variable – relative
feedback information – in TR5. Figure 4 shows the
mean completion times in TR4 and TR5 that are
grouped based on whether the target is reached or
not. As clearly seen, there is a significant difference
between the groups of subjects who did not attain
the target in TR4 and TR5 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
p=0.0001). Moreover, the performances of the
ones who attain the target are not significantly different
across these treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
p=0.259).
There are potentially two forces that lead to this
asymmetric result. First, in psychology literature, it
is argued that when goals are perceived as unreach-
able, individuals may give up (Locke and Latham,
1990), which leads to a lower performance. We argue
that during the experiment, the ones who could not
attain the target at the end perceive the (negative)
relative performance feedback as a signal that the
target is unreachable during the experiment and this
affects their performance negatively. Second, if one
obtains a negative feedback, it is much more likely
that this will be followed by a further negativeManage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/mde




TR5 0.217 (4.840) 1.40 (4.44)
Abovetarget 1.87 (3.410) 0.56 (3.291
Abovetarget*TR5 6.81* (4.145) 6.38 (4.036
Trial 3.99* (2.179) 3.71* (2.215
Error 12.18** (4.86) 10.13* (5.199
Trend 0.67** (0.267) 0.67*** (0.256
Controls No Yes
a




Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
aControl variables: gender (6.09, p = 0.24), aid (2.38, p = 0.63)
competitive (2.71, p = 0.056), bored (0.57, p = 0.72), preventive
(1.8, p = 0.19), and promotion (0.02, p = 0.98).
*, **, and *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 level, respectively.
Z. AKIN AND E. KARAGÖZOĞLU204feedback (the likelihood of this is21 87%). Moreover,
the distance from the average for the ones who obtain
negative feedback widens over time (Figure 5). This
further enforces the perception of the non-attainability
of the target.
Result 4: Under a two-level piece-rate payment
and self-performance feedback scheme, the
lower performance in TR5 (compared to the
ones in TR4) is mainly driven by the low perfor-
mance of those who could not reach the target.
In order to see whether having a two-level incen-
tive scheme has an effect on the performance, we look
at the performance difference between before and after
targets among the ones who exceed the target
(Table 10). Overall, this does not seem to affect
performance. The only difference is in TR5, in that
there seems to be a better performance after reaching
the target, but this effect is only marginally
significant.22
Potentially, relative performance feedback may also
affect the quality of the subjects’ effort. When we look
at the error rates across treatments (number of unsuc-
cessful tasks divided by total number of tasks), there is
no significant difference between treatments 4 and 5
(p=0.197). When we group the subjects as the ones
who attained the target and those who did not, we find
some differences (Figure 6). While in treatment 4,
between these two groups, there is a slightly significantFigure 5. Distance from Group Average of the Ones who are Above and Below Group Average in Two Treatments as a
Function of Group Average. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]








difference (p=0.078), in treatment 5, this difference is
high and significant (p=0.0003). Across treatments,
while the error rates of the ones who did not attain the
target do not differ (p=0.651), for the ones who attained
the target, there is a significant difference in that in treat-
ment 5, the error rate is significantly less23 (p=0.024).
What we can infer from these observations is that result
4, mentioning the low performance of the ones who did
not attain the target, is not due to their high error rates,
but it is due to their slowness in completing the tasks.24
Figure 6. Error Rates. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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In this paper, with five treatments, we experimentally
investigate the effectiveness of self-performance feed-
back, self-chosen targets, and relative performance
feedback combined with an exogenous target in in-
creasing work performance in a task that requires
steady and careful effort under time pressure. These
are very important questions for scholars, managers,
policymakers, and practitioners because the methods
we investigate here are frequently used in organiza-
tions to boost work performance. For successful
implementation of these methods, understanding
the interactions between them and the environment
(e.g., the presence/absence of other methods, task
type, and time pressure) is very important. For
the firms that are able to provide feedback about
performance correctly and easily, these methods are
especially important because they allow firms to
influence performance in an almost cost-free manner.
Our findings show that some feedback methods do not
necessarily increase performance as opposed to the
common belief. In order for a feedback mechanism to
be effective, a thorough perspective should be employed
and all the details that may render feedback effective
should be carefully considered. Our results add to this
understanding by showing that feedback frequency,
the absence or presence of extrinsic motivators, and
exogenously setting targets play crucial moderator roles
in determining the effectiveness of feedback.
In our analyses, we investigate the effects of the
aforementioned methods using various non-parametric
statistical tests, OLS regressions, and panel regres-
sions, which allow us to see the effects at both individ-
ual and aggregate levels and in both a static and aCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.dynamic fashion. First, we observe that providing
self-performance feedback does not increase perfor-
mance and even decreases it (Result 1). This is at odds
with the implicit assumption that performance
feedback has a positive effect on work performance
(for an extensive review of the effects of feedback
interventions, see Kluger and DeNisi, 1996, which
shows that about 40% of all feedback intervention
studies result in negative effect). We think that the
presence of a task that requires a steady effort and
attention under a time pressure in our experiment
offers a reasonable explanation for the negative result.
In our experiment, what participants should do to
obtain higher earnings is simply to complete as many
tasks as possible (correctly) given the time limit. In
the presence of such a task, any piece of information
that distracts participants’ attention from the task
likely leads to a deterioration in the task performance:
once the feedback information is provided, partici-
pants are possibly tempted to look at it, which may
reduce their pace, focus, and attention.
Another factor that enforces the previous argument
is the screen format that we use. Subjects can always
see feedback information on the screen. An alternative
design can allow only seeing feedback on the screen at
the end of each task for a short period of time, which
may potentially mitigate our result if employed. Many
real-life tasks – especially in organizations, factories,
etc. – are generally completed one after another with
an intense focus and under a time pressure. In that
sense, we think that the task we have represents a
large class of real-life jobs that involve repeating
the same tasks over time. To sum up, this result
contributes to the literature studying feedback mecha-
nisms by showing that feedback frequency is one ofManage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
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mance feedback.
Second, we observe that the presence of self-
imposed targets does not improve task performance
(Result 2). This is in contrast with studies that find a
positive effect (e.g., Podsakoff and Farh, 1989; Goerg
and Kube, 2012). We believe that one major reason for
this result is the lack of extrinsic incentives tied to self-
imposed targets. In this treatment, participants’ earn-
ings are independent of the relationship between their
actual performance and self-imposed targets. Hence,
participants – when asked to set a target – might have
declared just a mere prediction for their performance
instead of a real target to which they would feel
attached. We are aware that even in the lack of
extrinsic/monetary incentives, setting a target may
influence individual behavior because of intrinsic
motivations agents have (Gómez-Miñambres, 2012;
Locke et al., 1981; McCalley and Midden, 2002;
Wright and Kacmar, 1994). For instance, self-image
or social image concerns would be some reasons for
such an influence. However, we can infer from our
analyses that, in addition to the lack of extrinsic incen-
tives, participants in our experiment possibly lacked
strong intrinsic motivations that would positively
influence their goal setting and performance as well.
This is understandable because (i) it is a very anony-
mous environment, (ii) there is no interaction (e.g.,
competition and tournament) with other participants,
and (iii) there is no clear reason for subjects to feel
any emotional attachment to the task. In summary, this
result contributes to the literature that investigates the
effect of self-imposed targets on performance, by
showing that without necessary tangible or intangible,
intrinsic or extrinsic incentives, targets may not be
chosen optimally and thus, may not produce the
positive effect on performance they are expected to
produce.
Third, we observe that providing relative perfor-
mance feedback combined with an exogenous target
(e.g., individual performance and group average
together) leads to a deterioration of performance
(Result 3). Moreover, this fall in overall performance
(at the aggregate level) is mostly due to the fall in
the performances of participants who are not able to
attain the assigned target (Result 4). This indicates that
providing a relative performance feedback may
backfire because of the deteriorating morale of low
performers. There is already a great debate over the
effect of relative performance feedback on individual
and/or group performance in organizations. As
mentioned earlier, there are studies on both sides, thatCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.is, finding negative and positive effects. In that sense,
two results we have here contribute to that strand of
literature by presenting yet another instance where
relative performance feedback is bad for the overall
performance (Bandiera et al., 2013; Ederer and Fehr,
2007; Eriksson et al., 2009; Müller and Schotter,
2010; Pablo and Martínez-Jerez, 2009). In order to
clarify the effect of relative performance feedback on
performance, a linear piece-rate payoff structure
(e.g., nonbinding target) and no assigned target are
possible extensions that can be made.
As we mention earlier, the results of our experi-
ment and hence the observed effects of the methods
we investigate are crucially influenced by the task
characteristics and the presence/absence of other
elements such as accompanying extrinsic/material
incentives and an exogenous target. We should
mention that more experimental studies, some of
which are mentioned earlier, where task characteristics
and extrinsic incentives are manipulated are needed to
be able to conclude that our results are significantly
influenced by these factors. Intricate details about the
environment, task, time-frame, and so on may gain
importance in designing optimal performance en-
hancement mechanisms.APPENDIX - INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for coming. Our experiment involves
completing a series of tasks on the computer that
require effort and attention. Instructions are simple.
If you follow them carefully, you can earn a consider-
able amount of money. The experiment will last at
most 1 hour. Your earnings depend on your task
performance. Your earnings will be paid in cash
immediately at the end of the experiment. The collected
data set in this experiment will be used only for research
purposes and the information regarding participants
(identity, choice etc.) will be kept completely
confidential.
The experiment will start when you log in the ex-
periment website and will continue with a 5-minute
practice period designed for understanding the nature
of the task. Afterwards, you will be given a target to
complete in the 30-minute actual experiment, and then
the actual experiment will start. At the end of the
experiment, you will be asked to fill out a short survey.
Then, you will be paid your earnings personally, and
the experiment will be ended.
Here are the task details: As in the following
picture, you will be given a series of numbers (20
seven-digit numbers on the left and one, two or threeManage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
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right of this, you will be given the same set of 20
numbers but randomly ordered and be asked to enter
the corresponding one, two or three digit number on
the right. The entry of this set of numbers correctly
is considered as one task. This task is analogous
to the following situation: The seven-digit numbers
represent student ID numbers and one, two or three
digit numbers represent exam grades of these students.
You are asked to enter grades of each student into the
computer correctly.
After the log in, there will be a practice period so
that you can get used to the task and guess more or less
how much time you need to complete each task. This
practice period will last 5 minutes. At the end of the
5 minutes, you will see a new screen on which you
will be given a target to complete in the 30-minute
actual experiment. This target will be the same for
each participant and affects your earnings from the
experiment (this will be explained in the following
paragraphs). On the same screen, there will be a
“Start the experiment” button. You will need to press
this button to start the experiment. It is important for
every participant to follow these steps simultaneously
in order for the whole experiment to end in a timely
manner.
After pressing the “Start the experiment” button,
every participant will be able to see the remaining timeFigure A1. Screen Shot For TR3. [Color figu
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.on the right side of the screen. There will be a number
showing the “Task number: …” which will be at the
right side of the screen that shows the number of jobs
on which you have worked until now. It will be
increased by one as you press the OK button at the
bottom regardless of whether the task is completed
correctly or not. The followings will be also available
on the screen: the target, the number of tasks that you
have completed correctly until that time, and your
total cash earnings until that time. In addition, you
will see the average number of tasks that have been
completed in your group until that time (this average
number will not include your tasks). At the end of
30 minutes, you will be asked to fill out a short survey.
After the survey, your total earnings (in TL) will
appear on the screen, which will be paid personally
to each participant. The amount written on the screen
will be the total amount that you will be paid. It will
be determined as follows:
Total Earnings:
You will earn (1 TL for every correctly completed
task until you reach the target – target included)
+ (1.5 TL for every correctly completed task above
the target) + (5 TL show up fee)
In other words, you will earn 1 TL for each task
that you complete correctly in the real experiment. In
addition to this, you will earn an extra 0.5 TL bonus
for each correctly completed task above the target.re can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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from the experiment will be calculated as follows:
If you correctly complete 12 tasks: 12×1 TL=12 TL
If you correctly complete 13 tasks: 13×1 TL=13 TL
If you correctly complete 14 tasks: 13× 1 TL+ (14 –
13) × 1.5 TL=14.5 TL
If you correctly complete 15 tasks: 13× 1 TL+ (15 –
13) × 1.5 TL=16 TL
If you correctly complete 16 tasks: 13× 1 TL+ (16 –
13) × 1.5 TL=17.5 TL
This earning (plus 5 TL show up fee) will be paid
to you. You will not be paid for the jobs that are com-
pleted in the practice period. The amount of money
that you will get will be given on the screen just after
the survey. The show up fee will be included in this
amount. Completing as many tasks as you can in 30
minutes will increase your earnings.
Some points about which you should be careful.
• Be careful, because if you enter even a single
number incorrectly, that whole task will be
counted as incorrect.
• Do not press the F5 key, because all numbers that
you have entered until that time would be lost
and this would cause you to lose time.
• A hint for fast typing: When you want to enter
the first number, click on the related place and
enter your number. In order to enter the second
number, press on the TAB key instead of clicking
with your mouse. When you do this, the cursor
will move to the next space automatically. This
will prevent you to click on spaces every time,
and you will be able to save some time.
• To submit a task, click on the ‘OK’ button. The
‘Enter’ key will not work.
• While entering numbers, you should enter care-
fully. When you click on ‘OK’ button, you will
not be asked ‘Are you sure?’, and you will auto-
matically move to the next task. If you entered all
numbers correctly, it will be accepted as correct.
However, if you enter even a single number
incorrectly, it will be counted as incorrect and
this will cause you to lose time.
Thank you for your participation
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1. This is a topic that has been attracting a great
scholarly interest. See Prendergast,1999; Baker,
Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Murphy and Cleveland,
1995 and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2011 for
comprehensive reviews of incentive design in firms.
2. Our study mainly utilizes Feedback Intervention Theory
by Kluger and DeNisi (1996) that is based on both
control theory (Carver and Scheier, 1981) and goal-
setting theory (Locke and Latham, 1990). It basically
argues that feedback interventions change the locus of
attention and therefore affect task performance behavior,
which is regulated by comparisons of feedback to goals
or standards.
3. Heath et al. (1999) argue that goals that people set
become their reference points and their behavior overlap
with the predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Wright and Kacmar (1994) showed that
subjects who specify their own goals were less likely to
change them when given the opportunity than the ones
who were assigned a goal, which indicates a higher
commitment to self-set goals. For a thorough review
about the relationship between goal setting and feed-
back, see Locke et al. (1981).
4. In the literature, non-binding and self-specified goals
are commonly mentioned as commitment strategies that
mitigate self-control problems (see Hsiaw, 2013 and
Koch and Nafziger, 2011 for theoretical exposition
and Kaur, Kremer, & Mullainathan 2010 for empirical
evidence). In our study, commitment aspect of goal-
setting does not play a role since our design involves a
very short and intense work period that does not have
any intertemporal aspect and no self-control issues arise
in tasks with these features.
5. In a recent related paper, Gómez-Miñambres (2012)
offers a principal-agent model in which the principal
uses (non-binding) goals as a tool to manage agents’
intrinsic motivation. He incorporates the concept of
personal standards into the model, which summarizes
the psychological response of the individual towards
the goal. He shows that the agents’ production, as well
as the goals set, increase with the agents’ personal stan-
dards and goal setting increases agents’ achievement
and principal’s profits in equilibrium.
6. For theoretical models that conclude that it is better to
conceal information, see Lazear 1989; Lizzeri, Meyer
and Persico, 2003; Ederer, 2010 and Ertac, 2005.
7. See also Bandiera et al. 2013; Delfgaauw et al. (2013);
Hannan, Krishnan, & Newman, 2008
8. Azmat and Iriberri (2010), in an educational natural ex-
periment, find that the provision of relative performance
feedback enhanced performance by 5% for the whole
distribution. Falk and Ichino (2006) observe a very clear
positive peer effect on worker performance under a
fixed payment scheme. Under flat-rate incentives, Mas
and Moretti (2009) find that there are positiveManage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
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productive personnel into a shift. Blanesi Vidal and
Nossol (2011), by using a firm level data set find that
individual disclosure of relative standing increased long
term average productivity by about 6% without
affecting the quality of production.
9. Goerg and Kube (2012), in a field setting, find that both
self-chosen goals and exogenously set goals (depending
on their size) improve performance even when not
backed up by monetary incentives. Podsakoff and Farh
(1989) with a two period similar experimental design
find that the ones who are informed that they are below
average set a higher goal and perform better relative to
the ones who are informed that they are above average.
This is different from ours in the sense that they not only
give feedback before goal setting but also manipulate
actual performance information when they give
feedback. McCalley and Midden (2002) in an energy
conversation setting found that participants in goal-
setting with feedback treatments save significantly more
energy than those in no-goal-setting with feedback
treatment. Goal setting treatments include both a
self-set goals group and an experimenter-assigned goals
group, and they found that energy savings of these
groups are not significantly different from each other.
10. Azmat and Iriberri (2012) is probably the closest study
to ours, but there are some important differences. We
have one long working period, goal-setting, two-level
piece-rate incentive scheme and continuous group feed-
back. Our approach is also different from Blanes i Vidal
and Nossol (2011) in terms of incentive scheme.
Bandiera et al. (2013) examine the effect of rank incen-
tives in teams and find that when endogenous team for-
mation is allowed, revealing performance ranking
information substantially decreases performance. This
difference is mainly due to decline in performances of
teams that are below the 40th percentile in the productiv-
ity distribution. In our experiment, there is no team
structure but the last mentioned result is somewhat
related to our result in the sense that the negative effect
of relative performance feedback comes from the low
performances of people who are not able to attain the
goal (more than 80% of whom are always below
average). In a field experiment, Delfgaauw et al. (2013)
with a tournament scheme find that the ones who are
close to winning bonus increase their performances
while others do not respond to incentives. However, they
find no overall significant effect.
11. Although there is no specific reason to choose this num-
ber as 20, we believe that this task induces the subjects
to focus more and put more effort into each task,
because carelessness costs about 2min, which is a
considerable amount of time in a 30-min experiment.
Moreover, we believe that our task also mimics diverse
real-life organizational tasks that are completed consec-
utively under time pressure with an intense focus.
12. The number of observations is not large on aggregate
level. Thus, we prefer referring to the results from more
reliable panel data regressions.
13. Because subjects are randomly assigned to only one
treatment and we do not have subjects participating in
different treatments, running the fixed effects modelCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.does not give us the treatment effect. Random effects
models are vulnerable to omitted variable bias, but we
think we included potentially effective characteristics
in the models.
14. Although we carefully choose a task that is relatively
ability independent, some people are good at numbers,
typing, and so on. The trial variable is added to capture
this effect.
15. There is not much variation in the ‘trial’ variable across
subjects. It changes from 0 to 3 with a mean of 1.265
and a standard deviation of 0.87 in treatments 1 and 2.
In the whole data, it is virtually the same.
16. Control variables we use in the analysis are gender,
GPA, aid, competitive, bored, preventive and promo-
tion. Gender is a dummy variable, 1 for male. GPA is
the cumulative grade of subjects out of 4.00. Aid is a
dummy variable, 1 for students with scholarship. Com-
petitive is the answer to the question ‘How competitive
are you?’ on a 1–7 scale, 7 being very competitive.
Bored is rating of ‘I am a person who gets bored quickly’
on a 1–7 scale, 7 being ‘I completely agree.’ Preventive
is rating of ‘I was worried that I might not be able to
avoid poor outcomes’ on a 1–7 scale, 7 being completely
agree. Promotion is rating of ‘I envisioned that I would
accomplish desired outcomes’ on a 1–7 scale, 7 being
‘I completely agree.’. Kluger and DeNisi (1996) identify
personality as a moderator of feedback. They conjecture
that different personalities may respond to various goal
interventions differently. Previous studies use most of
the control variables we use. Gender is potentially an
important determinant of behavior in this kind of task,
in which, although real competition does not exist in
all of the sessions, there is a sense of race that may
trigger different reactions by different gender. Although
the task is relatively ability independent, some users may
be more comfortable with numbers and computers. The
students with scholarships are in general academically
more successful and they may be more able in these
kinds of tasks. Aid and GPA, which are strongly corre-
lated, are used due to this possible effect. Competitive
measure is again added to capture the possible effect of
this characteristic on performance, especially when there
is group feedback. Bored variable may be important due
to the nature of the task. Getting bored easily may lead to
under/overestimation of the results. In previous studies,
prevention and promotion focus that are assumed
to be the primary motives underlying behavior in
self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) are used both
as control variables and as independent variables that
potentially affect behavior.
17. In psychology literature, there is substantial evidence
that frequent feedback may have negative performance
implications (see Kluger and DeNisi, 1996, for an
extensive review). Wulf, Schmidt, and Deubel (1993)
discuss potential negative effects of frequent feedback
in the context of motor learning. Moreover, Salmoni,
Schmidt, and Walter (1984) explain negative perfor-
mance effects of high frequency of feedback on learning
transfer of motor tasks and Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor
(1979) discuss how frequent outcome feedback impairs
cognitive consistency. Although contexts are different,
we believe that same reasoning can be made in our caseManage. Decis. Econ. 38: 193–211 (2017)
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mine performance.
18. We exclude one subject because although we explained
clearly in the instructions, he or she asked explicitly
whether the targets affect the payoff and then he or
she set an unreasonably high target, 50, which is impos-
sible to reach. He or she actually completed only nine
tasks correctly.
19. This is a rough grouping because although most of the
subjects were in one of the groups, some of them during
the actual task completion were sometimes above and
sometimes below the average. We include these
subjects in the group in which they spent more time.
A more precise panel data analysis will follow.
20. Although we do not present them here, we also run OLS
regressions to check whether people above average and
below average are affected by provision of relative
performance. The results confirm significant difference
in the latter and no difference in the former feedback
(because the number of observations are small on
aggregate level, we prefer referring to the results from
more reliable panel data regressions on this analysis).
21. This is because the experiment is a one-shot experiment
without separate work periods, and feedback is on the
aggregate performance from the beginning to the end
of this one-shot experiment.
22. When we run the same regressions with only the tasks that
are successfully completed, this weak effect vanishes.
23. We repeated the same analysis for the other treatments
too. We made pairwise tests between treatments: the
null hypothesis that error rates are the same across treat-
ments cannot be rejected (Kruskal–Wallis test, p-values
are greater than 0.40 in all comparisons). We also tested
the null hypothesis that the average error rate is equal
across all treatments. This hypothesis cannot be rejected
either (Kruskal–Wallis test, p= 0.90).
24. The numbers of successfully completed tasks in TR4
and TR5 of subjects who could not attain the target are
11.73 and 10.72, respectively, and this difference is sta-
tistically significant (p=0.043). For the ones who attained
the target, these are 15.22 and 16.27, respectively, and
this difference is not statistically significant (p= 0.667).REFERENCES
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